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UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS: THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER
OF NEPAL'S SUPREME COURT*
Richard Stith"
INTRODUCTION
In the course of teaching jurisprudence each year, I try to show my
students the problems posed for liberty and for legitimacy by the combi-
nation of legal ambiguity and legal finality. In particular, I ask them
whether, especially in this post-Legal Realist age of non-interpretivism,
they should not be afraid of a United States Supreme Court endowed
with the power to write its own Constitution and call it the law of the
land.
Every year, at least one loyal American student responds by pulling
the democratic rabbit out of his or her hat, by invoking the possibility
of constitutional amendments to restrain a renegade Court.' I respond
* Copyright © 1995 by Richard Stith. All rights reserved. A slightly different
version was published as The Extraordinary Counter-Majoritarian Power of the New
Supreme Court of Nepal, 4 ASIA L. REv. 38 (New Delhi 1995). Notes are styled
according to the author's preference.
** J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana
46383, U.S.A. The author twice visited Nepal to gather information for this article,
once in 1991 and again in 1992. The kind assistance of Delhi University and of the
Indian Law Institute is gratefully acknowledged. Portions of his analysis of Indian
constitutional theory were presented to gatherings of members of the law faculties of
Delhi University and Poona University in those same years.
1. The respected Indian scholar P.K. Txipathi has advanced a similar argument:
[I]f the Supreme Court of the United States lays down a constitutional norm
which is definitely not acceptable to the people of the United States, by and
large, that norm can be set aside by the democratic process; with the result
that in the United States also, as in England, the last word on the basic law
and social policy of the nation rests with the elected representatives of the
people and not with the courts.
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both with practical arguments, such as that the amendment process in
the United States is too cumbersome to be used effectively to limit the
Court and with theoretical ones, such as that the Court can interpret the
amendments as it sees fit. I fear, however, that many of my students
escape the wonderful perplexity in which I have sought to trap them.
If my students' faith in law extended to the law of Nepal, they could
not so easily get away. The Nepalese Constitution of 1990 proclaims the
invalidity of attempted constitutional amendments that violate "the spirit
of the Preamble."2 Since that Preamble, like most, is exceedingly vague
and multi-faceted, a Supreme Court granted the power to enforce its
"spirit" can legally put down any rebellion against judicial authority.
There is thus no lawful way to bring a faithless Court back under the
law.
Nepal's is, of course, not the only constitution to limit the amending
power. The United States Constitution contains at least a minor limit,
Article V's protection of each state's equal representation in the Senate.
And, for example, France does not permit amendments affecting the
"republican form of government,"' while Germany entrenches basic
principles of federalism and human dignity.5 The Indian Supreme Court
Note that Professor Tripathi's purpose was to use United States practice to
critique the more unlimited form of judicial power then emerging in India. P.K.
Tripathi, Rule of Law, Democracy, and the Frontiers of Judicial Activism, 17:1 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 17, 28 (1975).
2. NEPAL CONST. art. 116(1) (1990). The English translation used in this article
is that authorized by His Majesty's Government, Ministry of Law, Justice & Parlia-
mentary Affairs and published in March, 1992 by the Law Books Management Board,
Babar Mahal, Kathmandu, Nepal. An earlier English translation may be more easily
found. See Nepal, in XII CONSTrtLriONS OF THE COUINTRIES OF THE WORLD 15-218
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONSTITtrriONS]. A
chronology of events leading up to promulgation by Kunjar M. Sharma, Mark J.
Plotkin, and Kenneth S. Gallant is also provided. Id. at 1-11.
3. It has been suggested that Article V's protection of equal state suffrage might
be amendable after all. Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution cannot be Amend-
ed?, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 717, 722-727 (1981). On the other hand, it has also been
argued that there exist other substantive limits on the power of amendment to the
United States Constitution. Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitu-
tional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084-86 (1991).
4. LA CONsTrrTUON [CONST.I art. 89 (France) (1958).
5. Article 79(3) of the Basic Law reads as follows: "Amendments of this Basic
Law affecting the division of the Federation into Laender, the participation on princi-
ple of the Laender in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles I and
20, shall be inadmissible." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 79(3) (F.R.G.).
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enjoys extraordinary freedom. It has successfully claimed for itself the
right to strike down amendments that violate the "basic structure" or
"essential features" of the Constitution-without any real textual man-
date or standard at all.6 Nepal is noteworthy, however, both for the rich
ambiguity of its textual standard, and for the explicit mandate to go
beyond the letter of that text to find and enforce its "spirit." Moreover,
unlike France and Germany, but like India, Nepal has established a
Supreme Court without Constitutional rival. That Court appears7 to be
the sole and final interpreter both of statutes and of their constitutional-
ity in all significant contexts.' Furthermore, it has unusually great power
to control its own docket and even its own future composition.9
The new Federal Constitutional Court seemed to rest this perpetuity clause on
"principles that are so fundamental and to such an extent an expression of a law that
precedes even the constitution that they also bind the framer of the constitution . . ."
Southwest Case 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951) (quoting with approval the language of the
Bavarian Constitutional Court, in WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANEmHAUs,
COMIARATWE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAv 208, 209 (1977)).
6. Kesavananda v. Kerala, 1973 S.C.R. 1461; see discussion infra pages 13-16.
The Indian claim, unlike the German text, has never been founded by a Court majori-
ty on the existence of binding pre-constitutional law. The Indian limitation is for this
reason, too, more remarkable than the German. To find an essence in an act of will
is more difficult than to find it in natural law.
7. The constitutional text is read this way by all Nepalese lawyers with whom I
have spoken. I argue, however, that another reading is more plausible. See infra
pages 27-30.
8. This essay focuses on the Supreme Court's extraordinary power over Nepalese
democracy. The non-democratic institutions of the military and the monarchy are not
subject to judicial review by the Court. NEPAL CONST. arts. 86(1), 88(2)(a), 31, 35(6),
41(2). The most obviously important and non-reviewable power of the King is that of
declaring a three-month state of emergency suspending certain fundamental rights.
With the cooperation at least of the upper house of the legislature, the state of emer-
gency may be extended to 12 months. Id. art. 15.
9. See discussion infra pages 4-6.
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Why have Nepal's dominant political forces"0 agreed to this stark
consolidation of judicial power?" In particular, why has the Left,
which has at times sought to abolish the Nepalese monarchy newly
legitimated in the Constitution, let the Supreme Court have the power to
block future constitutional reform? This article explores three factors
which must be considered in answering these questions: the contingen-
cies of recent Nepalese political struggles, the influence of Indian consti-
tutional theory, and the apparent lack of consideration of alternatives to
judicial review. In a final section, I shall suggest that the text of the
Nepalese Constitution may still leave open the path to certain of these
alternatives.
I. THE NATURE AND POWER OF THE NEPALESE SUPREME COURT
Members of the Court have great power over the Court's future com-
position. Associate judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the
King, after having first been chosen by the five-person Judicial Coun-
cil." The Chief Justice and the two seniormost judges on the present
Supreme Court, however, form a majority of the Judicial Council, giving
the core of the Court power over the Court's future composition.'3 Fur-
thermore, although the Chief Justice is selected by the more politically
structured Constitutional Council,14 he or she must first have been a
10. The words "dominant political forces" are used advisedly, for the Nepalese
people as a whole participated neither in any constituent assembly nor in any ratifica-
tion process. See discussion infra, note 135 and accompanying text. Indeed, the con-
stitution was drafted and promulgated over the objections of numerous ethnic and
communal groups. Michael Hutt, Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990, 31 ASIAN
SUR. 1020, 1028-37 (1991). Article 112(3) of the Nepal Constitution excludes from
political life all parties formed "on the basis of religion, community, caste, tribe or
region." In this it was following Indian precedent. For India, Section 123(2) of the
Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, formally prohibits such appeals to standards of
group loyalty.
11. The phrase "consolidation of judicial power" is taken from activist law pro-
fessor Upendra Baxi. Professor Baxi has celebrated the Indian Supreme Court's "con-
solidation of supreme judicial power" through its "Basic Structure" doctrine in his
work COURAGE, CRAFT, AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT IN THE
EIGHTIES viii (1985).
12. NEPAL CONST. arts. 87(1), 93(1).
13. Id. art. 93(1). The other two members of the Judicial Council are the Minis-
ter of Justice and "one distinguished jurist to be nominated by His Majesty." Id.; see
The Revolt of the Indian Judges, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 36 (explaining that
India appears more recently also to be headed toward Supreme Court control of its
own membership).
14. See NEPAL CONST. art. 117 (stating that the Constitutional Council is com-
[VOL. 11: 1
NEPAL'S SUPREME COURT
member of the Court for at least five years.'5 All Supreme Court judg-
es may hold office until age sixty-five.' 6 Tenure as Chief Justice is
seven years. 7
All other courts "and judicial institutions,"'8 except the Military
Court, are subordinate to the Supreme Court' 9 "All shall abide" by
decisions made in individual cases." Moreover, any "interpretation giv-
en to a law or any legal principle" established by the Supreme Court in
the course of litigation is binding on the government and on "all offices
and courts."'" Thus the Court has power to make law through prece-
dent.
Article 88(1), the paragraph giving the Supreme Court the power to
strike down legislation, deserves to be read in its entirety:
Any Nepali citizen may file a petition in the Supreme Court to have any
law or any part thereof declared void on the ground of inconsistency with
this Constitution because it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the
enjoyment of the fundamental rights conferred by this Constitution or on
any other ground, and extraordinary power shall rest with the Supreme
Court to declare that law as void either ab initio or from the date of its
decision if it appears that the law in question is inconsistent with the
Constitution
Note that the Nepalese Court has here been given more than the duty
of judicial review of legislation. The unlimited option of non-retroactivi-
ty can be read as an explicit permission to change the fundamental law
of the land as of the date of its decision. Even more important may be
the complete abrogation of all standing requirements for a petition alleg-
ing the unconstitutionality of a law?' Any citizen may so petition, not
posed of the following members: Prime Minister, Chief Justice, Speaker of the House
of Representatives, Chairman of the National Assembly, Leader of the Opposition in
the House of Representatives and (for appointment of the Chief Justice only) the
Minister of Justice and "a Judge of the Supreme Court").
15. Id. arts. 87(1), 87(2).
16. Id. art. 87(5).
17. Id. art. 87(1).
18. See generally CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 2, at 20 (providing an earlier
translation which used the potentially broader language "and other institutions exercis-
ing judicial power").
19. NEPAL CONST. art. 86(1).
20. Id. art. 96(1).
21. Id. art. 96(2).
22. Id. art. 88(1).
23. Bharat Raj Upreti, Reader in Law at Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu,
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only someone harmed under the law in question or some designated
office holder or holders. Few issues are likely to escape the scrutiny of
a Court with such wide open standing requirements.
The Constitution, in Article 88(2), goes on to grant the Court carte
blanche remedial powers:
The Supreme Court shall, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights
conferred by this Constitution, for the enforcement of any other legal
right for which no other remedy has been provided or for which the
remedy even though provided appears to be inadequate or ineffective, or
for the settlement of any constitutional or legal question involved in any
dispute of public interest or concern, have the extraordinary power to
issue necessary and appropriate orders to enforce such rights or settle the
dispute.24
The above provisions concerning judicial appointments and tenure,
stare decisis, judicial review of ordinary legislation, and remedies make
Nepal's Supreme Court a formidable institution. The primary focus of
this article is, however, on a further constitutional power that has been
placed within the reach of this already very strong Court. Article 116 is
entitled "Amendment of the Constitution."' Section (1) thereof declares
A Bill to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution, without preju-
dicing the spirit of the Preamble of this Constitution, may be introduced
in either House of Parliament:
Provided that this Article shall not be subject to amendment. 6
The remainder of Article 116 spells out the procedural requirements
for amendment. Two-thirds of the legislature must be present, and two-
thirds of those present must approve, in order for amendments to be
made to the Constitution.27 The King may delay but not prevent
author of a text (in Nepali) on constitutional law, and prominent Nepalese activist
advocate, has pointed out that "[t]his provision has broken through the traditional ap-
proach of case or litigation based review and the classical requirement of locus stan-
di." See Bharat Raj Upreti, An Insight into the Legal System of Nepal, Address Be-
fore the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Fall 1991) (on
file with the author); see also Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest
Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 498-99
(1989).
24. NEPAL CONST. art. 88(2).





amendments2 The relative procedural ease with which constitutional
amendments may be passed (the attainable majority, and the lack of any
requirements for referenda, local ratification, multiple readings and the
like) would seem further to enhance the importance of the interpreter of
the "spirit of the Preamble." If many amendments are attempted, that
interpreter can sift among them to shape the Constitution to its liking.
Who is that interpreter? Although there has been no definitive ruling
on this matter, by the Supreme Court or by anyone else, all Nepalese
legal professionals with whom I spoke assume without a doubt that it
will be that Court. Therefore, I shall assume the same in the following
pages, as we attempt to understand this extraordinary consolidation of
judicial power. However, it will later be my contention that Article
116(1) need not be read to confer amendment-review power upon the
Court. I shall seek to demonstrate my view in the last section of this
article.
The Preamble itselfe is a decent and even stirring aspirational docu-
ment, entirely suited to its function of introducing a new democratic
legal order. But the text provides no real guidance for constitutional
28. Id.
29. Id. The preamble states:
WHEREAS, We are convinced that the source of sovereign authority of the
independent and sovereign Nepal is inherent in the people, and, therefore, WVe have,
from time to time, made known our desire to conduct the government of the country
in consonance with the popular will;
AND WHEREAS, in keeping with the desire of the Nepalese people expressed
through the recent people's movement to bring about constitutional changes, We are
further inspired by the objective of securing to the Nepalese people social, political
and economic justice long into the future;
AND WHEREAS, it is expedient to promulgate and enforce this Constitution,
made with the widest possible participation of the Nepalese people, to guarantee basic
human rights to every citizen of Nepal; and also to consolidate Adult Franchise, the
Parliamentary System of Government, Constitutional Monarchy and the System of
Multi Party Democracy by promoting amongst the people of Nepal the spirit of fra-
ternity and the bond of unity on the basis of liberty and equality; and also to estab-
lish an independent and competent system of justice with a view to transforming the
concept of the Rule of Law into a living reality;
NOW, THEREFORE, keeping in view the desire of the people that the State
authority and sovereign powers shall, after the commencement of this Constitution, be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, I, KING BIRENDRA
BIR BIKRAM SHAH DEVA, by virtue of the State authority as exercised by Us, do
hereby promulgate and enforce this CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NE-
PAL on the recommendation and advice, and with the consent of the Council of
Ministers.
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limitation. Its aims are vague (e.g. "social, political and economic jus-
tice," "basic human rights," "fraternity," "equality," "the Rule of Law")
and potentially in conflict."
We may observe that the Preamble incorporates in its heart perhaps
the greatest antinomy of modem law, the tension between formal legal
justice and substantive social and economic justice. Should the law aim
at rule compliance or at results? More concretely, should it strive for
equality in form or in substance? This last dilemma has tom apart Indi-
an constitutional theory for the last forty years, as we shall see below.
Does equality mean that large landholders must be treated the same as
or differently from other property owners? Are affirmative action quotas
required or forbidden?
I submit that no one person or institution can answer these questions
fairly. The genius of democratic theory has been to divide the task, with
the legislature authorized to enact laws aimed at substance and with the
courts charged with formal rule enforcement.3 So, for example, in the
body of Nepal's Constitution, social transformation goals are called
"Directive Principles and Policies" '32 and made fundamental for legisla-
tion. Yet, unlike the rest of the Constitution, they are not to be en-
forceable in any court.33 The Preamble, of course, necessarily and prop-
erly incorporates basic aspects of these Directive Principles and Policies,
so that an amendment-supervising Court ends up required to enforce
them after all, along with the formal tasks more common to courts.
Even where the Preamble is most concrete it can provide little guid-
ance to the Court, because its "spirit" is what must be enforced. That
spirit could easily be said to contradict the mere letter of the Pream-
ble.34 Can "Multi Party Democracy" be abolished in favor of single-
party rule, even though the former is listed as a specific goal in the
Preamble? Perhaps so, for a single party could be said to further the
objective of "fraternity." Indeed, the only time the word "spirit" is actu-
ally used in the Preamble is in the phrase "spirit of fraternity."
30. Id.
31. As a socialist who is also a democrat, I support this division.
32. NEPAL CONST. arts. 24-26.
33. Id. art. 24(1).
34. See Consolidating National Gains: Speeches of Shrimati Indira Gandhi 258
(1976), quoted in D.C. Jain, The Forty-Second Amendment: An Evaluation, in INDIAN
CONsTmTUTON: TRENDS AND IssuES 56 (Rajeev Dhavan & Alice Jacob eds., 1978)
(stating that former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, urged, on the
occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the (Indian) Constitution, that "[florin and letter
must sometimes change in order to preserve the spirit").
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Why did the framers of the Nepalese Constitution decide to give such
counter-majoritarian power and discretion to their new Supreme Court?
The short answer, the merely political answer, will be explored first. It
is not difficult to see how the present Article 116 emerged as a compro-
mise in a moment of great political pressure. But why did this solution
occur to the framers? The answer here takes us deep into Indian consti-
tutional history, on which Nepalese legal culture, and particularly the
new democratic regime, is based. There we shall see how such consoli-
dated judicial power came to be regarded as legitimate and preferable.
We shall also take note of the relative absence of Indian thought con-
cerning institutional alternatives to judicial review.
11. COURT POWER AS THE CONSEQUENCE OF A "CONSTITImON OF
SUSPICION"
An observer at the meetings in which the final version of the consti-
tutional text was drafted has stated that "ours is a constitution of suspi-
cion."35 Mistrust among the three most powerful actors in the constitu-
ent process-the King, the Nepal Congress Party, and the United Left
Front (ULF)-led each to turn to the Supreme Court as its "saviour."
Because they could not trust each other, they decided to trust the Court.
That suspicion appears to have reasonable grounds. King Mahendra,
the father of the current monarch, King Birendra, used his emergency
powers to abolish the democratic Constitution of 1959 only a year and a
half after it had gone into effect. ' The ULF was composed of various
Communist factions, and therefore suffered from the anti-democratic
behavior of sister parties that had installed one-party rule in other na-
tions. The center-left Congress Party was not credible to either extreme,
and must also have borne some onus as a result of the years of self-
serving actions of its Indian namesake.
Moreover, one must bear in mind the astonishing rapidity with which
the Constitution of 1990 was drafted and promulgated. The Congress
Party and the ULF launched the "Movement for the Restoration of De-
mocracy" on February 18, 1990.' After some violence, the King ap-
35. Interview with anonymous source (Jan. 25, 1992) (name withheld upon re-
quest); see Bharat Raj Upreti, supra note 23 (confirming this view); see also Inter-
view with Ganesh Raj Sharma, the respected monarchist (Jan. 27 1993) (on file with
the author) (same).
36. See supra note 35.
37. RiSHIKESH SHAHA, POLrICS IN N-PAL 1980-1990: REFERENDum, STALEMATF,
AND PEOPLE POwER 8 (1990).
38. Except as otherwise indicated, the source of the data on the drafting process
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pointed an interim government led by the Congress Party with ULF
participation. In late May, after further struggle, the nine-person Consti-
tutional Recommendation Commission, headed by the Supreme Court's
Justice Upadhyaya, began its deliberations.39 On August 31, 1990, the
initial draft was completed.'"
According to press reports, Congress Party members had wanted three
basic features of the new constitution to be non-amendable: constitution-
al monarchy, multiparty democracy, and the sovereignty of the peo-
ple.4 At the last moment, however, the ULF refused to support the
first two. Justice Upadhyaya succeeded in bringing about a compromise
in which the "basic structure"'4 of the Constitution would be subject to
amendment, but only under the heightened requirements of a three-
fourths legislative majority and a national referendum.43 Since it would
have been up to the future Supreme Court to identify the contents of the
"basic structure,"' it would seem that the transfer of control over
amendments to the Court began at this point, though the popular percep-
tion continued to be that it was constitutional monarchy and multiparty
democracy which were subject to special protections from amendment.'
The Council of Ministers of the interim government then had a
chance to make revisions, which it did. Sensing an important victory in
the principle of universal amendability, despite the special hurdles to be
overcome, most of the Left fought vigorously to retain the compromise
just discussed. The King and Congress party members were alarmed,
however, by the mere possibility of radical amendments. No one knew
what results the first election might bring and how easy a three-fourths
majority might be to obtain. This same uncertainty led some of those on
the Left, who feared the potentially conservative tendencies of the mass-
es,4 to discount the value of an open-ended amendment process. In the
is Hutt, supra note 10, at 1029. See the brief chronology by Gallant, supra note 2, at
1-11.
39. Hutt, supra note 10, at 1022.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1028-30.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1032.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1032. Hutt implies that specific amendatory limitations were still in the
draft constitution at this stage, but the English-language copy in my possession has
only the words "basic structure."
46. Interview with Tirtha Man Sakya, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Law and Jus-
tice (Sept. 2, 1991).
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end, with the reluctant acquiescence of the ULF, the Council of Minis-
ters adopted the present "spirit of the Preamble" wording of Article 116
in its final draft. The real victor here was the Nepal Congress Party, for
the King later made an unsuccessful attempt to revert to a specific list
of entrenched protections,' and Left leaders later regretted their com-
promise (especially after doing quite well in the initial elections). ' On
November 9, 1990, King Birendra promulgated the Constitution without
further change in its amendatory provisions.
Some of the framers had indeed worried that too much power was
being entrusted to the new Supreme Court. The Constitutional Recom-
mendation Commission thought, however, that one institution had to
have final power to decide legal issues, and Commission members trust-
ed the Court more than they trusted other institutions. There seemed no
way to give someone else the ability to limit the Court without maling
matters worse.49
m1. INDIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF CONSOLIDATED JUDICIAL POWER
The concept of "basic structure" was the intermediate step between a
textually limited Court and the present Court guided only by a "spirit."
That intermediate concept came directly from Indian constitutional law,
where it had been closely associated with the Indian Preamble. To un-
derstand the availability and attractiveness of the route taken by the
Nepalese drafting process, we must, therefore, turn to India.' Despite
their complexity, we cannot avoid summarizing some of the salient
features of post-independence legal developments in that nation, for
India's prior consolidation of judicial power in a single supreme court
made itself strongly felt in Nepal.
Like that of Nepal, the Constitution of India contains a set of Funda-
mental Rights,5' to be enforced by the Supreme Court against stat-
utes.52 Virtually all these rights are classic negative defense rights of
the individual against the State, rather than entitlements to positive assis-
tance by the State. In other words, they require State inaction rather
than State action. India also has a list of "Directive Principles of State
47. Upreti, supra note 23.
48. Sakya, supra note 46.
49. See Interview with anonymous source, supra note 35.
50. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing India's strong influence
on Nepalese law).
51. INDiA CONST. arts. 12-35.
52. Id. arts. 13(2), 32(1).
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Policy" that spell out affirmative actions the State must undertake to
achieve social and economic goals. 3 These are, however, declared not
enforceable by any court. 4
The first twenty years of the independent Indian polity saw a seesaw
struggle between Court and Parliament as each sought to comply with
its constitutional mandate. The legislature would enact laws (e.g. land
reform) interfering with the right to property (then guaranteed by Art.
31) or interfering with the right to equal protection and equality before
the law,55 in order to further some social welfare purpose found in the
Directive Principles. The Court would often counter by declaring the law
void for violating Fundamental Rights. Parliament would then use the
amendment procedure found in Art. 368, requiring only a two-thirds
Parliamentary majority for amendments relevant to fundamental rights
and to most other parts of the Constitution, to validate its legislation
after all. 6
Article 31B, inserted in 1951 by the First Amendment to the Indian
Constitution, gives a marvelous sense of the depth and tragedy of this
conflict. 7 That article simply creates a list of state and national laws,
the Ninth Schedule, that are declared valid regardless of whether they
infringe on any Fundamental Rights. The list has been added to from
time to time by two-thirds majorities in Parliament, while the state or
national legislature originally passing each law is free to repeal it. In
other words, in adding to the Ninth Schedule, Parliament does not mere-
ly abridge the Fundamental Rights, it does so without even attempting
to articulate new and generalizable legal principles. A law on the list is
valid. A similar or even identical law not on the list may be declared
void.
Parliament may well have felt it was acting quite appropriately. No
planner, public or private, no one who cares about results can operate
efficiently if he or she must constantly reformulate every contingent and
instrumental command as a universal formal rule. And no decent planner
would want to modify or give up his or her ideals every time they were
abridged in practice.
Yet from a formal, legal point of view, more than specific individual
rights were at stake. By its unprincipled use of amendments, Parliament
53. Id. arts. 36-51.
54. Id. art. 37.
55. Id. art. 14.
56. Id. art. 368.
57. Id. amend. I.
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was sacrificing the very idea of a constitution, even a changeable one.
Still, the Supreme Court upheld Article 31B, and forbore from challeng-
ing Parliament's plenary amendment powers until 1967.
In that year the Court finally made a stand. In Golak Nath, by a
bare majority, the Court stated in dictum, prospectively only, that no
amendment which violated the Fundamental Rights would be held con-
stitutional. The Court's basic argument was simple: Article 13(2) states
that any "law" taking away or abridging those rights is void. A constitu-
tional amendment is a kind of "law." Therefore, amendments abridging
the Fundamental Rights are void.59
Negative political reaction to Golak Nath was overwvhelming among
Indian opinion leaders, particularly those of the Left. Judicial review
seemed to be a device for the protection of the rich minority against the
poor majority, which in India is quite a majority indeed. Indira Gandhi
swept back to victory in 1971, based in part on an anti-Court campaign,
and her party passed two key constitutional amendments designed to
counter Golak Nath. The Twenty-Fourth amended Articles 13 and 368
to make clear the former did not apply to the latter, and that the amend-
ing power itself was plenary.' The Twenty-Fifth amendment inserted
Article 31C into the Constitution. It provided hat no law effectuating a
policy aiming to secure the Directive Principles found in Article 39(a)
and (c), dealing with property redistribution, was to be held invalid for
infringing on equality (Art. 14), basic freedoms (Art. 19) or the right to
property (then found in Art. 31).61 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment also
strengthened the non-justiciability of the Directive Principles, by stating
that "no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such
policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it
does not give effect to such policy." 2
In the great Kesavananda case' of 1973, the Supreme Court made a
strategic retreat, only to advance much further. First, the Court declared
the Golak Nath doctrine to be mistaken, on the ground that a constitu-
58. 1967 S.C.R. 1643.
59. INDIA CONST. art. 13(2).
60. Id amend. XXIV.
61. Id. amend. XXV.
62. Id.
63. Kesavananda v. Kerala, 1973 S.C.R. 1461; see David G. Morgan, The Indian
'Essential Features' Case, 30 INT'L & CorP. L.Q. 307 (1981) (providing a detailed
analysis and careful critique of the Kesavananda case); cf. Nani A. Palkhivala, OUR
CONSTrrutON DEFACED AND DEFImD (1974).
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tional amendment is really not a law in the ordinary sense.' Further-
more, it upheld the two amendments mentioned above, except for the
last section covering legislative declarations of intent, as well as some
new additions to the Ninth Schedule.65
At the same time, again by a single vote, the Court announced a new
limitation on constitutional amendments. They may not abrogate the
"basic structure" or "essential features" 66 of the Constitution. Though
there were varying concurring opinions rendered on the point, the net
argument of the Court seems to be that the framers of the Indian Con-
stitution could not have intended the word "amendment" in Article 368
to include changes so drastic as to alter the very identity of the Consti-
tution.67
The Court was not in agreement on the content of these basic fea-
tures. Some judges focused upon the Preamble,' which states:
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute
India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR69 DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and
integrity" of the Nation;
64. Kesavananda, 1973 S.C.R. at 1465.
65. Id. at 1470.
66. Id. at 1461. The expressions "basic structure," "basic elements," "basic frame-
work," "basic features," "fundamental features," "essential features," and other like
variations appear to be used interchangeably by the majority in Kesavananda. Id.
67. The arguments in support of this proposition are based in political theory
as well as in textual analysis. It is said, for example, that the sovereign people would
not have wished to delegate to Parliament the power to destroy the basic elements of
the new Constitution. See id. at 1603, 1624-25.
68. Id. at 1534-35, 1603.
69. The words "SOCIALIST SECULAR" were added in 1976 by the
Forty-Second Amendment. INDIA CONST. amend. 42.




IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of Novem-
ber 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES
THIS CONSTITUTION.
Seven out of the thirteen justices stated in dictum, however, that the
right to property did not impose any limit on constitutional amend-
ments.71 This majority included those who favored no basic structure
limit at all, plus one of those who had voted to impose such a limit but
who explicitly excluded the right to property from the unalterable basic
structure?!
While the justices stated that all further additions to the Ninth Sched-
ule would be examined for conformity to the basic structure, the only
law actually struck down in Kesavananda was, as stated above, the
"declaration" clause attached to the new Article 31C.' The Court could
therefore, inspect Article 31C laws to make sure that they "give effect"
to the appropriate policies. 4
Though the Indian Court gave up its Golak Nath role of absolute
defender of the Fundamental Rights, the Court arrogated itself an even
more difficult task. The Constitution as a whole, especially the Pream-
ble, contains extensive language supporting affirmative as well as nega-
tive rights.' With regard to future amendments, the Court assumed the
role of guardian of the essentials of both the Fundamental Rights and
the originally non-enforceable objectives found in the Directive Princi-
ples of State Policy. In addition, as its approval of Article 31C makes
clear, the Court's role in supervising statutory law would also henceforth
be enhanced, for it would be involved in judging various laws' contin-
gent and instrumental effectiveness in furthering social goals. In such ad
hoc judging of the usefulness of particular abridgements of fundamental
rights, the Court, I submit, cannot but make the same kind of contingent
and changing guesses that any legislature must make.76 Scholars both
71. Kesavananda v. Kerala, 1973 S.C.R. 1461, 1881.
72. Id. Justice Khanna cast the important swing vote on this point
73. Id. at 1880.
74. Il
75. INDIA CONST. pmbl.
76. There can, of course, be disagreement as to how effective the legislation
must be in order to be constitutional. That, it seems to me, is the crux of the debate
between Chief Justice Chandrachud and Justice Bhagwati in Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India, 1980 S.C. 1787. The former (for the majority) claims, at page 1810,
that only a "direct and reasonable nexus" is required between the law in question and
the relevant objectives specified in the Directive Principles. The latter argues, at page
1856, that each provision of the law must be "basically and essentially necessary for
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critical and supportive of Kesavananda have judged the Court thence-
forth to be a "'constituent assembly in perpetual session,' corresponding
to Parliament in the United Kingdom."'
In other words, according to the Court, the essence of the Indian
Constitution is contingent. What it requires and forbids depends in part
upon judgments of effectiveness in achieving the social policy goals
delineated by the Directive Principles. This result-oriented changeability
alone might not serve to distinguish "basic structure" from many other
highly indefinite legal concepts. At the same time, the Indian Supreme
Court has, however, held that the framers intended this essence to be
unchangeable, so that all amendments which seek to alter it must be
struck down. This idea of an unchangeable changing essence, this
strange juxtaposition of Platonism and instrumentalism, is surely a near
antinomy.
Here is another puzzle. Kesavananda was at least as anti-majoritarian
as Golak Nath. It gave the Court more power and much more discre-
tion, for the undefined "basic structure" might include selections from
any part of the Constitution. The search for the essence of the Constitu-
tion was described recently by the Attorney General of India as "a blind
man in a dark room searching for a black cat which is not there."'
Yet Kesavananda is today widely accepted while its predecessor was
not. Why? Beyond the vast details of history, I think at least two rea-
sons can be discerned.
First of all, the Court moved to the political left. It jettisoned the
right to property and took upon itself the task of safeguarding the social
welfare policies of the State. The new self-image of many of the
Court's leading members can perhaps best be felt in the following de-
scription by Justice (as he then was) P. N. Bhagwati:
[The] independence of the judiciary .. .is a basic feature of the Consti-
tution .... It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and
continually that our Constitution is not a non-aligned rational char-
ter .... The judiciary has therefore a socio-economic destination and a
creative function. It has ... to become an arm of the socio-economic
giving effect to the Directive Principle." Both standards, however, must involve con-
tingent estimates of the usefulness of the law in achieving the objective. For further
discussion, see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
77. Tripathi, supra note 1, at 34. Baxi rejoices in the Court's "concurrent con-
stituent power." BAXi, supra note 11, at 69.




revolution and perform an active role .... It cannot remain content to
act merely as an umpire .... [Tihis approach to the judicial function
may be all right for a stable and static society but not for a society pul-
sating with urges of gender justice, worker justice, minorities justice ....
[The judiciary] must become an active participant ... through a pro-
active goal oriented approach. But this cannot happen unless we have
judicial cadres who share the fighting faith of the Constitution'
Bhagwati insists, quoting Justice Iyer, that a "social philosophy in active
unison with the socialistic Articles of the Constitution"' is indispens-
able for the appointment of a judge. His colleague Justice Desai adds in
the same case that "[ain activist role . . is a sine qua non for the
judiciary. If value packing [of the courts] connotes appointment of
[such] persons otherwise well qualified . . . then not only the value
packing is not to be frowned upon ... but it must be advocated with a
crusader's zeal."'"
In 1985, during his tenure as Chief Justice, Bhagwati commented that
judges need not "feel shy or apologetic" about their "law creating
roles":
The Supreme Court of India has been performing this role in the last 7
or 8 years by wielding judicial power in a manner unprecedented in its
history of over 30 years .... The courts of India ... started the legal
aid movement... fostered the development of social-action groups...
developed the strategy of public interest litigation .... In the process
[the Court] has rewritten some parts of the constitution... contrary to
the intent of the makers of the constitution.'
79. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1982 S.C. 149, 197.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 446.
82. See Judicial Activism in India, 17(1) GARGOYLE 6, 7-8. That "intent of the
makers" was not ancient. The Constitution had gone into effect only in 1950. Jamie
Cassels, writing in 1989, agreed with Chief Justice Bhagwati: "Painfully aware of the
limitations of legalism, the judiciary of India has struggled over the last decade to
bring law into the service of the poor and oppressed." Cassels, supra note 23 at 497.
According to Cassels, "(t]he new judicial activism may . . . be understood as part
of. .. a strategic reversal of previous judicial priorities in order to win popular
support and achieve a more prominent role in Indian society." Id. at 510-11. Rajeev
Dhavan has commented:
[sipurred on by an inchoate alliance of social activists, lawyers, journalists and
academics, some judges of the Supreme Court sought to rethink the fundamen-
tal concerns of the Constitution ... . The result of these efforts has been
referred to as India's 'Public Interest Law Movement.' Although these initiatives
have been connected with varieties of social activism, the movement as a whole
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H.M. Seervai, perhaps the leading constitutional theorist of India, has
objected that the Directive Principles of State Policy are simply not
intended to be enforced by the courts, either directly or indirectly by in-
sisting on "effective" amendments or legislation.83 Nevertheless, the
Court seems committed to the notion that the Directive Principles are as
much a part of the basic structure as are the Fundamental Rights, and
that structure will be used as a standard in striking down unconstitution-
al amendments. With regard to statutes, Justice Bhagwati has argued in
dissent that, under a later addition to Article 31C,84 any laws with a
"real and substantial connection" to a Directive Principle must be valid,
regardless of the effect on Fundamental Rights." In a later case,
Bhagwati was able to join the main opinion of a five-judge bench in
holding to the trumping power of properly effective state policies, even
against rights to equality and basic freedoms, and in declaring prior
limiting language to be mere dictum.86 As has been pointed out by a
leading commentator,87 this position may appear at first glance judicial-
ly modest, in that it cuts back on fundamental rights as a standard for
review, but it actually widens the scope of review to include the contin-
gent causal nexus between law and results.
The Supreme Court's new and active stance has been welcomed by
leading academics and other emergent elites.88 One important writer-ac-
has been a middle class affair .... The Supreme Court entered into a
partnership with the new self-declared 'trustees' of socialism.
Rajeen Dhavan, The Constitution as the Situs of Struggle: India's Constitution Forty
Years On, in CONSTIUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 373, 383
(Laurence W. Beer ed., 1992); see id. at 416-17.
83. See H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW OF INDIA 1600 (3d ed. 1984).
Binod K. Agrawala has opposed the judicial practice of reading the non-enforceable
Directive Principles into the enforceable Constitution, arguing that to do so is to alter
the basic structure of the Constitution. Binod K. Agrawala, The Legal Philosophy of
P.N. Bhagwati, 14 INDIAN BAR REV. 136, 142-43 (1987).
84. INDIA CONST. amend. 42, arts. 14, 19. In 1976, the Forty-Second Amendment
made laws that gave effect to "all or any" of the Directive Principles the ability to
override the Fundamental Rights found in Articles 14 and 19. Id.
85. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1980 S.C. 1787, 1855. Both majority
and dissent agree, however, that the Directive Principles form part of the basic struc-
ture of the Constitution. Id.
86. Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., 1983 S.C. 239 (appear-
ing to negate the majority opinion found in Minerva Mills on this issue).
87. S.P. SATHr, CONSTrrUIONAL AMENDMENTS 1950-1988, at 79 (1989).
88. Sathe claims that, whereas there had been a "consensus among the
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tivist has expressed his delight at the special access that social action
litigators now have to a Court which is certainly not "independent" in
the old legalistic sense." Indeed, many support the Court's imposition
of "basic structure" precisely because it has no structure. Important
Indian scholars have opposed any precise enumeration by the Court of
the elements of the basic structure concept. Dr. Virendra Kumar has
agreed that the Court must preserve the "total identity" of the Constitu-
tion by striking down amendments, but has argued that the Court must
not explain specifically what its standard is, for that would make the
Constitution "static." Professor C.G. Raghavan also wants the "unique
intelligentsia" against Golak Nath for upholding the status quo, "there is now an
agreement generally among all political parties, intelligentsia, the legal profession as
well as the Press [sic] that the power to amend the Constitution must be subject to
restrictions." Id. at 71, 91; see supra note 82.
89. BAXI, supra note 11, at 23. This United States-educated scholar has been
quite influential in introducing sociological realism and judicial interventionism into
Indian jurisprudence. Rajeev Dhavan, Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of American
Scholarship on Indian Law, 33 AhM. J. CoMP. L. 505, 517-18 (1985). Professor Baxi's
wholehearted rejection of formalism and embrace of activism take on special social
and political significance in light of his later appointment as Delhi University's Vice
Chancellor.
Baxi's COURAGE, CRAFT, AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SuPP.wi COURT IN
THE EIGHTIES ends, significantly, with an appeal to Friedrich Nietzsche and an exalta-
tion of "the judicial will to power." BAXI, supra note It, at 110. The book also
begins by quoting Nietzsche's aphorism that "courage slayeth also fellow suffering."
Id. at 15. Baxi deduces that the Indian Supreme Court's courage will help end the
suffering of the masses.
Does it matter that Nietzsche's kind of courage was meant to end pity rather
than to end suffering? Baxi appears to have been misled by the words "fellow suffer-
ing," which are an odd translation of the German Mitleiden. A better rendering would
be "pity" or "compassion." One of the major themes of the work Baxi quotes is the
need of the will to power to free itself from pity for others. Compare Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIErsca- 172, 368 (Thomas Common trans.,
1954) with, ALso SPRACH ZARATHUSTRA 120, 252 (Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag-
Goldmanns Gelbe Taschenbilcher, undated).
My point is not that Professor Baxi praised Nietzsche unthinkingly but that he
praised the "will to power" unthinkingly. Or perhaps not so unthinkingly. Baxi recent-
ly felt sufficiently powerful to reprimand the Court for evincing the wrong kind of
pity. When Chief Justice Ranganath Misra dared to criticize the activist lawyers in-
volved in the Bhopal tragedy for "misleading victims," Baxi reportedly responded by
denouncing such "judicial absolutism" and suggesting that the bar demand that the
Chief Justice's remarks be expunged from the judgment. Judicial Accountability Panel
Plea, TIvms OF INDIA, Oct. 7, 1991, at 4.
90. Quoted with approval by Sathe. SATHE, supra note 87, at 92-93.
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identity" of the Constitution to be preserved, but not by having its na-
ture spelled out, for "an abstract and doctrinaire approach to the con-
struction of the basic structure limitation has to be avoided since judicial
functionalism and pragmatism are the desideratum ... ,,9" Professor
S.P. Sathe, similarly, supports the high court judges' careful use of the
doctrine of constitutional essence, but points out that "[n]ow that they
are the determiners of such a highly political and policy question such
as what is basic structure, they have to admit that their function cannot
be merely of the interpretation of the Constitution."
To recapitulate: The basic structure doctrine was built upon the prem-
ise that there is an unchangeable nature of the Constitution. At the same
time, that structure was denatured by the incorporation of contingent
instrumental policies. The resulting antinomy, however, became widely
accepted by modernizing opinion leaders in part because both of its
contradictory elements were useful. What better political weapon could
there be than a nominal essence, a temporary eternal truth?
The Supreme Court's move to the political left cannot, however, be
the full explanation for Kesavananda's acceptance. Why should the
Basic Structure weapon be needed in the first place to further the
Constitution's social welfare policies? Since those policies are directed,
by and large, toward securing the interests of the poor, who form the
vast majority of Indians, why keep the basic structure limit at all? Why
not just let Indian democracy, via a plenary amendment power, have its
way?
The answer most often found in Indian legal literature' is that
Indira Gandhi's seizure and misuse of quasi-dictatorial emergency pow-
ers during the 1970s showed that in India even the majority needs the
Court to defend it. But, as David Gwynn Morgan has well observed, the
Indian electorate was sufficiently alert to eject Mrs. Gandhi from office
twenty months after she had assumed those powers.94 The problem for
the leading Indian elites may be that the electorate rejected Mrs. Gandhi
for the wrong reasons-not because she had imposed press censorship
and even imprisonment on opposition leaders, but because she had
sought to impose family planning and sterilization upon the masses.95
91. Id. at 93.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 73-74, 91.
94. Morgan, supra note 63, at 335.
95. Interview with Solil Paul, Professor of Law at Delhi University (Dec. 1991).
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In other words, as the Court had moved left, the electorate had
moved right. This is a second reason for the acceptance by Indian aca-
demic elites of the Kesavananda doctrine. Indira Gandhi was feared not
so much because she opposed the interests of the poor as because, for
many months, she had their support. Justice Sibha Rao had long ago
proclaimed it the "duty of the Court to protect people's rights against
themselves." This task became much more important in the minds of
many once it became clear that Indira Gandhi was not a true Leftist
and that there had been a "socialism holiday" in her legislation since
1969.' Professor Sathe has been most forthright in this regard, lament-
ing (without apparent irony) that in India the "ignorant masses can be
managed, elections can be won, and majorities can rule without any
regard for public opinion." And what is this non-majoritarian "public
opinion" which must be consulted? Professor Sathe elsewhere explains
that "the Press, the Judiciary, and the Intelligentsia have to act as re-
straining forces on democracy [capitalization in original].' '
"[C]harisma, religion, and other populistic devices can be used for win-
ning elections,' ' 1 and in such a situation, "the Judiciary's role is
bound to be much more crucial."' 2
Despite the presence of a few distinguished more conservative consti-
tutional scholars, such as H.M. Seervai and D.D. Basu, my own inqui-
ries convince me that the Indian academic response to the basic struc-
ture limitation resembles overwhelmingly that of Professor Sathe and the
others quoted above.
Such widespread Indian acceptance of the basic structure doctrine,
both as a useful socialist tool and as a necessary protection from the
masses, strongly influenced the many Nepalese students studying at
Indian law schools. Until quite recently, virtually all of Nepal's lawyers
were trained in India."°3 Even today, Nepal is only just beginning to
implement its own LL.M. program, so that postgraduate studies must
still be done in India."°4 It is easy to see how the Nepalese Left, in
96. SATHE, supra note 87, at 96.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 74.
100. Id
101. Id. at 96.
102. Id.
103. Upreti, supra note 23. The chronology cited above indicates that from "the
time of Buddha ... ,Indian juridical and political conceptions have had an impor-
tant influence [on Nepal]." CONSTnrrNONS, supra note 2, at 1.
104. Interview with Bharat Bahadeer Karki, then dean of the Central Law Depart-
19961
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
particular, would find the basic structure doctrine congenial, despite its
potential for use by conservatives. It would be even more acceptable if
a formula such as "spirit of the Preamble" were adopted-for then the
new Supreme Court would have as its clear mandate the furtherance of
Directive Principles and Policies as well as Fundamental Rights. When
"Consultations in Constitutionalism" were organized in 1990 by two
leading activist Nepalese lawyers' groups, Forum for Protection of Hu-
man Rights (FOPHUR) and the Legal Research and Development Forum
(FREEDEAL), it is significant that the only Indian jurist attending was
the former Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court P.N. Bhagwati,
whose strong support for a socialist construction of basic structure has
been cited above.
IV. THE ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONSOLIDATED JUDICIAL
POWER IN INDO-NEPALESE LEGAL CULTURE
Acceptance of the idea that there is a basic structure of the Constitu-
tion that may not be changed, and that this basic structure includes both
individual rights and state welfare goals, need not in itself have led to
the centralized supreme judicial power now found in India and Nepal.
For the question still remains open: What institution or institutions shall
decide whether the basic structure has been violated?
There is no text in the Indian Constitution that explicitly gives the
Supreme Court this power. Indeed, there is no text which explicitly
empowers the Court to do more than to enforce the Fundamental Rights,
even against ordinary legislation." The Constitution need not have
been read to grant the Court the right to use infringement of the rest of
the Constitution as a reason to declare a statute ultra vires. In other
words, the Court need not have been thought to be the sole final inter-
ment, Tribhuvan University (Aug. 1993). I had a number of Nepalese students, includ-
ing Bharat Raj Upreti, supra note 23, when I was teaching in the LL.M. program at
Poona University in India in 1980-81.
105. Article 13 voids only laws "inconsistent with or in derogation of the funda-
mental rights." INDIA CONST. art. 13. Article 32 confers upon the Supreme Court only
those powers necessary "for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part," i.e.,
by Part III, "Fundamental Rights." Id. art. 32. Article 141 makes the Supreme Court's
determinations of law binding on all other courts, but does not extend the scope of
judicial review. Id. art. 141. Article 144 requires all authorities to act in aid of the
Supreme Court. Id. art. 144. By contrast, the High Court of a State may issue writs
to enforce Part m rights or "for any other purpose," according to Article 226. Id. art.
226. Article 245 makes all legislation subject to the provisions of the Constitution,
but does not specify an enforcement mechanism. Id. art. 245.
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preter of the entire Constitution. Yet Indian lawyers and law professors
almost universally"ce assume that the Supreme Court must in the end
decide all constitutional questions, or, on a more abstract level, that all
important questions of law must in the end be resolved by a single
supreme legal tribunal. Even Indira Gandhi at the height of her power
does not seem significantly to have questioned the idea that the Court is
the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution, for she always re-
sponded to its decisions with constitutional amendments rather than with
simple denials of the Court's authority.
V. Two ALTERNATIVES To JUDICIAL REVIEW
Nevertheless, there exist two clear alternatives to consolidated judicial
power, over statutes or over constitutional amendments. The first alterna-
tive can be called "checks and balances," and the second "separation of
powers."'"° The first approach has received relatively more attention in
United States thought and has been much more important in United
States history. Since Marbury v. Madison," there has been little ob-
jection to the Supreme Court's refusal to enforce legislation it deems
unconstitutional. There has been, and continues to be, however, support
for the parallel argument that other branches of government should
refuse to cooperate with actions of the Court that those branches in turn
deem unconstitutional. Thomas Jefferson believed that "nothing in the
Constitution has given [the justices] a right to decide for the Executive,
more than for the Executive to decide for them . ... That instrument
meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on each other."'"
Abraham Lincoln refused to acknowledge the Dred Scott decision's pro-
slavery interpretation of the United States Constitution to be binding
upon the rest of the federal government."'
106. DURGA DAs BAsu, COiPARATIVE CONsTUTONAL LAw 277-80 (1984) might
have been expected to explore other possibilities, but it contains only brief and
dismissive discussions. ld. at 273-83, 465-81. The anti-judicial review opinions which
he cites are all non-Indian. Id. Although Basu says that there are Indian "non-believ-
ers" in judicial review, he does not mention any names. Id. at 468. Of course, the
Indian Directive Principles were intended to be enforced entirely by the legislature, so
in this sense the omission of judicial review can be said to have Indian roots.
107. These are my own ferms. See CHRisTOPHER Wo.E, THE RisE OF MODERN
JuDIciAL REvIEw 90-97 (1986). Wolfe refers to "coordinate review" and "legislative
supremacy" as two alternatives to judicial review, with meanings close to mine. Id.
108. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
109. PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTruIo, ,L
DEcIsIONMAKING 1010 (2d ed. 1983).
110. Id. at 1011. One highly interesting mechanism for checking judicial review is
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This "checks and balances" approach has, in my opinion, the virtue
and vice of preferring law over order. Each branch of government seeks
to adhere to the law itself, in this case the Constitution, rather than to
any fallible interpreter of it. Judicial, or any other, tyranny thus becomes
less likely in the measure that anarchy, or at least inefficiency, becomes
more likely.
Fidelity to law may, however, be infectious. It is hard to see why
only governmental authorities should be faithful to the Constitution
rather than to its interpreters. As Sanford Levinson has recently argued,
the logic of Jefferson's and Lincoln's resistance to dictatorship ought to
apply to every citizen."' Suppose all three branches of government
conspire to subvert the Constitution. Should not every citizen resist? Per-
haps surprisingly, there is a major world constitution that seems clearly
to answer "yes," the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Article 20(4) of that Constitution proclaims: "All Germans shall have
the right to resist any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitu-
tional order, should no other remedy be possible.""'
Perhaps Article 13 of the Indian Constitution could be used in a
similar way by the defenders of Fundamental Rights, in order to resist
the Indian Supreme Court. That Article, after all, states that the "State
shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the [Fundamental
Rights].""' And any law so made is void." 4 But is not the Supreme
Court a part of the "State"?" 5 Is not a Supreme Court decision
"law"? "6 Therefore, any Court decision abridging those individual
rights is arguably void and need not be obeyed by any citizen.
Such radical priority of law over order is, however, frightening to
many. For this reasoning, perhaps, the "separation of powers" alternative
to judicial review has been much more common among the constitutions
of the world, though, again, it has apparently remained little discussed
Canada's creative experiment with limited legislative review of Supreme Court deci-
sions holding statutes unconstitutional. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), art. 33.
111. Citing the work of Ronald Dworkin, Levinson concludes (in a section entitled
Toward Individual Authority to Interpret the Constitution) that "'citizen review' is a
vital necessity of any polity that purports to call itself constitutional." CONSTITUTION-
AL FAITH 42, 46, 50 (1988).
112. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 21(4) (F.R.G.).
113. INDIA CONST. art. 13.
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 12.
116. Id. art. 13(3)(a).
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in India."7 The simplest version of this approach would involve no
review at all, neither of statutes nor of constitutional amendments. The
legislature would be left to abide by the Constitution according to its
own lights in its field of action (i.e., legislation and amendments) as are
the courts in their special field (i.e., fair trials and appellate processes).
Great Britain and Israel are often cited as examples of this approach-
and then dismissed with the remark that their constitutions are unwritten.
But there is no inherent contradiction between a written constitution and
the absence of judicial review. For example, pre-1958 French regimes
had written constitutions with at most very limited judicial review."8
The great defect of this system of "no review" has to be the fact that
each branch of government is obligated to control itself. The traditional
natural law maxim "[n]o one shall be a judge in one's own case" would
seem to indicate the shortsightedness of such permissiveness, its possible
invitation to lawlessness--even though high courts are regularly entrust-
ed with such self-limitation." 9
117. BASU, supra note 106, at 273-80. Even though Basu is an opponent of ju-
dicial lawmaking, id. at 252-72, and of the basic structure doctrine, id. at 353-66, he
does not appear to consider seriously the possibility that the "basic structure" doctrine
could be affirmed and yet left to the legislature for enforcement. Professor Sathe, who
later came to support judicial review of amendments, did once take just this position.
arguing that:
the only limitation upon the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is
that such amendment cannot seek to destroy the enduring values such as liber-
ty, justice and equality enshrined in the Constitution. This limitation is however
only a rule of political morality. Its sanction lies not in the judicial process but
in the vigilance of public opinion and the working of the political process.
S.P. SATHE, FUNDAmNTAL RIGHTS AND AMENDMENT OF THE INDIAN CONSTrrnMON
51 (1968). An American commentator has likewise recently urged the unconstitu-
tionality of amendments "incompatible" with the rest of the United States Constitution,
but has indicated a willingness, for democratic reasons, to leave the determination of
incompatibility up to political institutions. R. George Wright, Could a Constitutional
Amendment Be Unconstitutional?, 742 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 741, 763-64 (1991).
118. See generally Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L REV.
1023, 1044-56 (1989). See infra note 121. The early argument against judicial review
by Pennsylvania's Chief Justice John Gibson was also made in the context of a writ-
ten constitution. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825). Herbert Wechsler,
in his classic defense of judicial review, conceded that some constitutional questions
are political, "meaning thereby that they are not to be resolved judicially, although
they involve constitutional interpretation ... ." Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1959).
119. Without apparent irony, Justice Bhagwati (as he then was) in the same breath
both invoked this principle and claimed judicial exemption from it: "no authority ...
can claim that it shall be sole judge of the extent of its power under the Constitution.
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There are, however, many ways that power to review statutes could
be "separated" without being abolished entirely. In Italy, for example,
there are separate tribunals to decide the meaning of statutes and of the
Constitution.": In France today, a quasi-political Constitutional Council
is appointed to review new parliamentary legislation, while legislation
once promulgated may no longer be scrutinized for constitutionality;'
executive actions are monitored by the separate and independent part of
the executive branch called the Council of State. There are surely many
other conceivable ways to divide up the powers that the United States
and India have consolidated in a single tribunal. Chile's Supreme Court,
for example, can refuse to apply laws it considers unconstitutional in
particular cases, but it has no stare decisis or equivalent power to inval-
idate a law per se." The Chilean Constitutional Tribunal, on the other
hand, can declare a statute entirely void, but only, as in France, before
that law goes into effect." No jurisdictional conflict between the tri-
bunals need arise, but there can easily develop in Chilean legal culture
two different binding conceptions of what the same constitutional docu-
ment requires.
This Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution ..... (emphasis in origi-
nal). Rajasthan v. Union of India, 1977 S.C. 1361, 1413-14, quoted in BASU, supra
note 106, at 472.
120. The respective tribunals are the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Con-
stitutional Court. See John H. Merryman & Vincenzo Vigorti, When Courts Collide:
Constitution and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J. CoMP. L. 665 (1967) (critiquing the
resulting pluralism).
121. Only "organic laws" are reviewed, prior to promulgation, as a matter of
course; other bills must be brought to the Council prior to promulgation by specially
designated plaintiffs, usually minority legislators, at least 60 being required. LA CON-
STTuTION [CONST.] arts. 56-62 (France). Private citizens have no standing to protest
the constitutionality of a law, before or after promulgation. F. L. Morton's excellent
article, Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 89
(1988), concludes: "It is time that both American and European constitutional scholars
conceive of constitutional control as the 'genus' and the American model as just one
'species' (the judicial variation) of constitutional control." Id. at 110.
122. CONSTrrUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [Constitution] art. 80
(Chile) (1980).
123. Id. art. 82(2), (12). The Constitutional Tribunal was a creative invention of
the rightist Pinochet regime, intended as a bulwark for the status quo against radical
legislation. Article 57 even provides that a legislator who introduces a bill later de-
lared "manifestly" unconstitutional by the Tribunal shall lose his or her seat for two
years. Id. art. 57. The same penalty is imposed upon a parliamentary leader who
permitted the bill to be voted upon. Id.
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Such "separation of powers" approaches have the advantage of gener-
ating legal pluralism. They decentralize supreme judicial power, thus
preventing the values of one entrenched body from dominating the
whole legal order, without the dangers either of disorder or of tyranny.
A constitution may still mean whatever its official interpreters say it
means, but, because of the jurisdictional separation of these interpreters
into various groups, it need not mean only one thing. Individual and
community liberty-perhaps even more important, legal thought it-
self-can thus be preserved from domination by a single hierarchical
superior.
In terms of the "law vs. order" dilemma mentioned above, each con-
stitutional solution may be categorized as follows: If there is one final
authoritative interpreter of constitutional materials, as in India today,
then order ultimately has priority over law for everyone except that
interpreter. If each citizen may resist the highest court's flagrantly un-
constitutional edicts, as in Germany, then law finally trumps order. If
multiple institutional interpreters exist, then most of us just follow or-
ders, as in the first approach, but the multiplicity of leaders is a safe-
guard against one-dimensionality in the vision of each. In this last sce-
nario, in order for any one institution to achieve dominance, it must per-
suade, not just command, its fellow law interpreters.
VI. REINTERPRETING NEPAL'S CONSTITUTION TO ELIMINATE SUPREME
COURT AUTHORITY OVER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Let us look again at the constitutional text of Nepalese Article 116(1),
which bars amendments intended to interfere with the spirit of the Pre-
amble:
A Bill to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution, without preju-
dicing the spirit of the Preamble of this Constitution, may be introduced
in either House of Parliament:
Provided that this Article shall not be subject to amendment. 2'
The fundamental question is whether or not the Supreme Court has
been given the power, perhaps even the sole power, to enforce this
provision.
124. NEPAL CONST. art. 116(1).
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Note first of all that Article 116 itself is entirely silent on this ques-
tion."z By contrast, the article declaring ordinary laws void for incon-
sistency with the Constitution, Article 88, indicates in the very same
breath that the Supreme Court may make this determination. Indeed,
the supremacy of the Constitution over ordinary legislation comes into
the Nepalese Constitution only under the heading "Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court" (Article 88), and no mention is made in that section of
any jurisdiction to declare bills of amendment likewise void.2
Of course, one could argue that the word "law" in Article 88 includes
also the bills of amendment referred to in Article 116. But this Golak
Nath-style argument has long been discredited in Indian jurisprudence. It
seems settled there that laws and amendments are different in kind.
Indian jurisprudence has likewise held that the measure of constitu-
tionality is and should be different for statutes and for amendments,
whereas incorporating bills of amendment into Article 88's word "law"
would seem to subject both to the same standard. Of course, Nepal need
not adhere to Indian jurisprudence in these matters, but parallel argu-
ments that do not rely on Indian authority can easily be made. For
example, Article 88 and Article 116 specify separate standards of re-
view, i.e., "unreasonable restriction ... of the fundamental rights . . .
or on any other ground"'" and frustration of "the spirit of the Pream-
ble" respectively. 29 To review bills of amendments as Article 88
"laws" would be to impose two different and possibly contradictory
standards on them.
Moreover, in Nepal, unlike in India, an amendment is to be stopped
while still in the form of a "bill," which is draft legislation not yet
voted upon. Only bills "introduced pursuant to clause (1)," i.e., bills that
do not violate the preambular spirit, may be voted upon by the Nepalese
legislature. (Note also that the first draft of the new Constitution placed
its "basic structure-cum-referendum"' 30 limitations in a later clause of
the text, making those requirements appear posterior to legislative ap-
proval. By contrast, the placing of the present limitation in clause (1)
makes it seem a preliminary requirement.) The Supreme Court would
require a most unusual substantive and procedural jurisdiction in order
125. Id.
126. Id. art. 88.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 116.
130. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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to be able to abort amendments still in this embryonic "bill" stage of
development. The Constitutional text of Article 116 thus cannot easily
be read to grant the Court the power to review bills of amendment.
A far more plausible reading would be to leave that power within the
Nepalese legislature itself. It is, after all, legislators alone who are ordi-
narily concerned with "bills." Nepal would seem to have enacted a
constitutional limit on amendments which is thus only politically rather
than judicially enforceable. Such a limit at the amendment level is quite
analogous to the constitutional guidelines at the statute level which are
self-enforced by legislatures in nations such as Britain and Israel, and
even in Nepal with regard to the judicially non-enforceable "Directive
Principles and Policies" of Articles 24-26."'
There is, moreover, a close precedent for such an interpretation in
world constitutional history. Norway has long had a quite similar clause
in its constitution, providing that no amendment is valid if it alters "the
spirit of the Constitution."'" The prevailing interpretation of that Nor-
wegian clause is that it is only a directive for the legislature, and is not
to be used by any court as an excuse for refusing to recognize the legal
validity of an amendment... One should also note that this Norwegian
provision was discussed at the beginning of a widely-read Indian law re-
view article, the significance of which was acknowledged in the
Kesavananda case."M It is possible that the Nepalese framers drew up-
on Norwegian constitutional language in the course of their drafting.
Besides the above textual arguments, asserting that limits on amend-
ments should be left to the Nepalese legislature, there is another, found-
ed in political theory. The Nepalese Constitution was neither drafted nor
ratified by the Nepalese people. No constituent assembly was elected,
nor was any popular referendum held to approve the text. It was put
together, rather, in negotiations among the politically most powerful
groups and was promulgated by the King. Its felt or real legitimacy
may, therefore, be uncertain,"3 especially with regard to its prohibition
131. NEPAL CONST. arts. 24-26.
132. See D. Conrad, Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent
Power, 15-16 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. 347, 379-80 (1970) (discussing article 12 of
the Norwegian Constitution).
133. Id. at 380 n.10e.
134. Id. Conrad's article was cited in Kesavananda v. Kerala, 1973 S.C.R. 1461,
2020-21 by Justice Chandrachud, dissenting.
135. D. Conrad has argued that only with maximum possible popular consent can
constituent power legitimately be exercised. D. Conrad, Constituent Power, Amend-
ment, and Basic Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Reconsideration, 1977-78
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on further amendments. Indeed, that prohibition would seem to conflict
with the first sentence of the Preamble, which states that "the source of
sovereign authority ... is inherent in the people."'36 How can the sov-
ereign people be bound by a limit to which they never consented? On
the other hand, if the interpretation of the amendment power is left in
the hands of the people's political representatives, the fact of non-
amendment would, over time at least, be arguably a tacit ratification
legitimating all unamended sections.
What of the argument that no one, not even the legislator, should
judge his or her own case? Is it not important that some specialized
agency be given the job of scrutinizing all bills of amendment for con-
stitutional adequacy, an agency to some degree removed from those
sponsoring and voting upon the proposed amendments? Even if such
objections are persuasive," there are agencies other than the Supreme
Court that could assume the task of review. Perhaps, by analogy to the
French body of the same name, the Nepalese Constitutional Council
could, by constitutional amendment, be given this function, in addition
to its present less significant duties. That body is basically a council of
legislative leaders-the Prime Minister, the speaker of the House of
Representatives (lower house), the chair of the National Assembly (up-
per house), the leader of the opposition (in the House of Representa-
tives), and the Chief Justice-but it does not precisely mirror the politi-
cal form of the two houses that must finally vote on all amendments.
The Nepalese Supreme Court might well go along with the Constitu-
tional Council as the appropriate and sole agency scrutinizing bills of
amendment. There is a good deal of recent Indian jurisprudence discuss-
ing whether or not judicial review is a part of the basic structure. Some
early cases seemed to say that it was,' but recent opinions have clari-
fied that constitutionality depends upon the form of fair and independent
deliberations, not upon the location of the reviewing body within the
judicial hierarchy.' The Nepalese Constitutional Council, if operating
under clearly fair procedures, might well be able to meet such a
test."4
DELHI L. REv. 1 (1979); see supra note 10.
136. NEPAL CONST. pmbl.
137. In the case of the King's unreviewable discretion, these objections were obvi-
ously deemed insufficient. See supra note 8.
138. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1980 S.C. 1787, 1811-26.
139. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, 1987 S.C. 386.
140. But if the Council appeared to become a "judicial institution," the Supreme
Court might seek to claim authority over it under Article 86(1) of the Nepalese Con-
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CONCLUSION
Under urgent political pressure, Nepal has adopted a Constitution
giving extraordinary counter-majoritarian powers to its Supreme Court,
the greatest of which may be the power to prevent constitutional amend-
ments which violate the "spirit of the Preamble." Indian constitutional
theory and history, which exert a strong influence on Nepal, confirm
that this Court may well emerge as a leading or dominant political actor
in Nepal. If the Nepalese people do not in fact desire such a result,
there exists a legal alternative. The text of the Constitution of 1990 can
be interpreted to permit the legislature, or a related political body, to
become the appointed defender of the Constitution against inappropriate
alteration.
stitution. That article declares: "All other courts and judicial institutions of Nepal,
other than the Military Court, shall be under the Supreme Court." NEPAL CONST. art.
86(1); see supra note 13. However, a European-style "constitutional council" is usual-
ly conceived to be a legislative rather than a judicial body. ANTOMNIO CARLOS
PEREmA MENAUT, LECCIONES DE TEORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 249, 251 (1987). "T7he
[French] Conseil is not a court . . . the Conseil is part of the legislative process."
Henkin, supra note 118, at 1047.
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